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Good Parents: The Homonormative 
Appropriation of Children of Color 
Cassandra Hall1 
“If being married doesn’t protect straight black families from having their 
children taken away, it’s unlikely that it will protect queer black families.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following Kandaswamy’s critique of homonormative marriage 
initiatives, I consider how the entangled histories of marriage, parenthood, 
and white supremacy in the United States are articulated through the 
expansion of marriage rights to same-sex couples. Through critical 
discourse analysis, I trace the histories of same-sex marriage law with 
attention to how the homonormative subject is brought into relief through 
1 Master’s candidate in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Oregon State 
University. An earlier version of this work was presented at LatCrit XXI Conference, New 
Voices in Interdisciplinary Critical Scholarship section, Orlando, FL, October 2017. I am 
grateful to Dr. Ronald L. Mize for his thoughtful feedback and guidance in crafting this 
project. 
2 Priya Kandaswamy et al., Is Gay Marriage Racist?, in THAT’S REVOLTING: QUEER
STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 113-20, 115 (Mattilda Sycamore ed., 2004). 
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this discourse. In particular, I look to the ways in which white affluence is 
centered in efforts to legalize same-sex marriage. I read these texts against 
articles that focus on racial disparities in foster care and adoption. I chart 
the emergence of the “good” homonormative subject against the continual 
pathologization of subjects and families of color. Given that white lesbian 
and gay couples are more likely to foster or adopt children of color than 
their white cisgender/heterosexual counterparts, what might these parallel 
narratives reveal about homonormativity and its complicity in the 
precarity of families of color? How might we interrogate political and/or 
legal approaches that operate through the expansion of normativity? To 
conclude, I reflect upon the transformative potential of interdisciplinary 
critical scholarship and the collaborations and solidarities that emerge 
from this approach. 
II. “GAY ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN RAISES CONCERNS3:” 
A CASE STUDY 
Like so many stories about queer subjects in dominant media, this one 
begins with Madonna. In 2006, Madonna, and her then-husband Guy 
Ritchie, adopted David, a one-year-old baby from Malawi.4 Initially, 
David was said to be orphaned.5 It was subsequently revealed that David’s 
father was alive and had placed the child in an orphanage after his wife’s 
death.6 Nonetheless, he remained invested in David’s welfare, and was 
intent upon caring for the baby himself at a later date.7 As such, the 
adoption was contested. The conditions of David’s adoption fueled social 
debate on the ethics of transracial and transnational adoption.8 In October 
2006, National Public Radio entered into the fray with their story, “Gay 
Adoption of Black Children Raises Concerns.”9 
While the story opens with the conditions of David’s adoption, it shifts 
its focus to white gay (and implicitly, lesbian) couples who adopt black 
children. David’s adoption - notably, situated within a heterosexual 
marriage - incited discussion of white parents’ adoption of children of 
                                                                                                             
3 See Nancy Mullane, Gay Adoption of Black Children Raises Concerns, NAT’L PUB. 
Radio (Oct. 31, 2006, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
6411137. 
4 Mabvuto Banda, Father of Malawian Boy Backs Madonna Adoption Bid, REUTERS 
(May 12, 2008, 11:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malawi-madonna-
adoption-idUSL128248920080512. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See generally id. 
9 Mullane, supra note 3. 
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color broadly. Here, NPR reporter, Nancy Mullane, does not consider the 
problematics of placing children of color in white homes. While the host, 
Tony Cox, mentions a 1994 federal law now forbidding racial 
discrimination in adoptions (MEPA)10 that fueled transracial adoption, its 
inclusion is cursory. Its tenets are not defined, and its implementation and 
implications are not explored.11 Nor did she interrogate the coded rhetoric 
of transracial adoption, which almost without exception translates to the 
placement of children of color in the care of white parents.12 There are no 
efforts to contextualize her discussion of transracial adoption within 
racialized histories of child apprehension, the continual pathologization of 
families of color, or the appropriation of children of color to further 
imperial “civilizing” projects.13 
Rather, NPR’s coverage here was confined to gay and lesbian 
potential parents, namely Gregory Stewart and Stillman White - the white, 
gay adoptive parents to five black children.14 The piece centers upon their 
experiences as parents, and on the suspicions that befall white, gay men 
raising black children. Stewart and White maintain that they are cognizant 
of their children’s encounters with racism and queer-antagonism.15 As 
articulated here, the experiences of marginalization emerge not from 
pervasive anti-blackness, but from the public’s apprehension toward 
white, gay parents raising black children. As Stewart tells us, “We are 
struggling right now with the fact that our kids, because of the kid culture 
here, the school culture, are still being harassed for having two dads. And 
the bigger issue in San Francisco is having white dads.”16 Thus, the fathers 
are imagined as the objects of racism. Their five black children are 
peripheral to this racism, experienced through and because of their fathers’ 
whiteness. Notably, this narrative follows that of MEPA wherein (default-
to-white) adoptive potential parents were constructed as objects of 
discrimination if and when race was considered in children’s placement.17 
As articulated here, racial consciousness discriminates against white 
potential parents. As such, the codification of post-racial ideology found 
in MEPA18 is presented as a means of alleviating discrimination in 
adoption and foster policies and procedures. 
                                                                                                             
10 Id; see Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994). 
11 Mullane, supra note 3. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994). 
18 Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a) (18), 
1996(b)). MEPA (1994) provided some space for racial and/or cultural dynamics to be 
considered in placement. It maintained that federal funding would be revoked if state 
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Here, consideration of the potential harms of transracial adoption is 
deemed discriminatory. As such, the needs of children are peripheral to 
potential parent’s claims of discrimination. This positioning extends to the 
way in which children - and black voices generally - are featured in NPR’s 
story. Our sole encounter with Stewart and White’s children is through 
background noise. Further, these muted inclusions are always in reference 
to their fathers, as in the story’s final lines. As the audio fades, an 
uncredited child asks, “Papa?” and the show closes with White’s voice 
saying, “I’m right here.”19 This exclusion may have been informed by a 
desire to protect their children from public scrutiny, or by the legal 
mandates that often follow adoption. Nonetheless, its problematics are 
exacerbated by the erasure of black perspectives throughout the story. 
NPR cites the National Association of Black Social Workers’ (NABSW) 
30-year stance that the adoption of black children by white parents 
constitutes “cultural genocide.20“ However, its mention follows a 
statement that focuses on the adoption of black children by white, gay 
parents. Acting as a stand-in for actual black people, Mullane states, 
“Some in the black community say, wait, not so fast with this white gay 
couples adopting their kids thing.”21 Following Mullane’s introduction, 
NABSW’s condemnation of transracial adoption is rendered as a critique 
of white, gay parents’ adoption of black children. Thus, NPR obscures the 
statement’s relation to white supremacy, and situates it within debates over 
the right of (white) gay and lesbian subjects to parent (children of color). 
The single inclusion of a black perspective focuses on the “gay thing.” 
Mullane visits Top Hat Barber Shop in Oakland and asks six black men 
their feelings on “gays adopting black children.”22 As Mullane tells us, 
two-thirds of the men were critical of gay adoption.23 As presented here, 
the adoption of children of color by white parents is entangled with gay 
parenthood.24 Notably, Mullane’s question does not account for whiteness. 
                                                                                                             
agencies were found to make placement decisions based solely upon race. Following a 
public critique – that again, centered the perspectives of white parents who filed complaints 
– a 1996 amendment eliminated the inclusion of the word solely, so that no state agents 
could (a) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on 
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the person, or of the child, involved; or (b) 
delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of the 
race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved. 
19 Mullane, supra note 3. 
20 Id; see National Association of Black Social Workers, 1972 Position Statement on 
Transracial Adoption (Archived), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nabsw.org/resource/resmgr/ 
position_statements_papers/nabsw_trans-racial_adoption_.pdf (2017) 
21 Mullane, supra note 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
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It follows that the story’s only direct black voice would focus on 
sexuality. Michael, one of the men at the barber shop, says, “I’m 1,000 
percent against it, whether it’s black gay couples or white gay couples 
raising our children. It doesn’t matter. I’m against it. For one thing, it’s 
immoral. It’s going against God’s plan, for another thing. But another 
thing, the outcome is going to be disastrous.”25 
In her framing, Mullane exploits hegemonic narratives that place 
racialized subjects in opposition to the neoliberal progressive trajectories 
through which gay and lesbian subjects may be incorporated within a 
normative body politic. In the structuring of her question, Mullane does 
not allow for discussion of whiteness and transracial adoption outside of 
their potential entanglements with gay parenthood. This enables NPR to 
tell a story of transracial adoption that does not problematize whiteness or 
interrogate the ways in which children of color are incorporated within 
homonormative political projects. Following this case study, I trace 
transracial adoption and its entanglements with homonormativity. What 
do these conditions reveal about race in the neoliberal moment? In 
particular, I consider how neoliberal hegemony is sustained through 
transracial adoption and homonormativity. 
III. CONTEXTUALIZING TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 
I situate my discussion of the political economies of adoption within 
adoption’s racial histories. In particular, I consider how the 1994 Multi-
Ethnic Placement Act and the 1996 Welfare Reform Act shaped the 
current moment and its political economies. I look to the ways in which 
these laws have been used to justify what journalist Harsha Walia calls the 
“colonial violence of child apprehension.”26 
Journalist, Stacia L. Brown,27 explores the reasons for disparate 
adoption costs between black children and white children. As Brown tells 
us, “White and biracial babies ‘cost’ upwards of $30,000, while the cost 
to adopt black babies is around $17,000.”28 Brown examines the various 
justifications offered for this difference—’supply-and-demand,’ the length 
of time that parents wait for a child, prenatal expenses that are covered by 
public health coverage, and the like. Further, both states and federal 
                                                                                                             
25 Id 
26 Erin Durban-Albrecht, An Interview with Harsha Walia, THE FEMINIST WIRE (Mar. 
13, 2014) https://thefeministwire.com/2014/03/interview-harsha-walia/ 
27 See Stacia L. Brown, “The Problem with Saying ‘Black Babies Cost Less to Adopt,’” 
THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 1, 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/07/the-
problem-with-saying-black-babies-cost-less-to-adopt/277452/ 
28 Id. 
130 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
 
governments offer subsidies for “hard to place” children.29 In practice, 
“hard to place” often means children of color.30 
Prior to the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, race conscious subsidies 
were used to incentivize the adoption of children of color most often by 
families of color. Here, I briefly summarize the tenets of the Multi-Ethnic 
Placement Act and consider its implications and potential entanglements 
with homonormativity. Historically, adoption placements occurred along 
racial lines. As dictated by the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, agencies could 
no longer consider race or ethnicity when placing children. While the 
Multi-Ethnic Placement Act professes to be “color-blind,” in practice, it 
almost always translates to the placement of children of color in white 
homes. Further, the vast majority of discrimination complaints filed 
through the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act are filed by white potential 
parents31. 
Though articulated through a rhetoric of child protection, the Multi-
Ethnic Placement Act, in conjunction with the Child Welfare Act of 199932 
constitute a more punitive shift in child services and adoption policy. In 
particular, these acts reflect a focus on placement in permanent housing 
rather than family reunification. Here, I briefly consider the implications 
of these policies alongside Clinton-era welfare reforms. 
Through the neoliberal rhetoric of personal responsibility, Clinton 
pushed for a repeal of the existing Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC). In its place, he offered Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). In their 20-year retrospective of Clinton’s welfare 
reform policies, Kathryn Edin and H. Luke Shaefer write, “TANF was no 
simple safety net; it was also meant to be a springboard to self-sufficiency 
through employment, which it encouraged recipients to find work by 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. 
30 See Amanda Perez, Transracial Adoption and the Federal Subsidy, 17 YALE L. AND 
POL’Y REV. 201, 202 (1998). 
31 In her interview with Rachel Dolezal, a “white woman who identifies as black,” 
journalist Ijeoma Oluo considers the limits of a “transracial” politics that only moves one 
way. Throughout their interview, Dolezal asserts that her “insistence on black identity . . . 
[will] help free visibly black people from racial oppression by helping to destroy the social 
construct of race.” Oluo refuses these logics and maintains that Dolezal’s racial fluidity is 
a function of white privilege. As Oluo writes, I am more than a little skeptical that Dolezal’s 
identity as the revolutionary strike against the myth of race is anything more than 
impractical white saviorism—at least when it comes to the ways in which race oppresses 
black people. Even if there were thousands of Rachel Dolezals in the country, would their 
claims of blackness do anything to open up the definition of whiteness to those with darker 
skin, coarser hair, or racialized features? Similarly, transracial adoption allows for the 
movement of children of color into white homes. It seldom allows for the movement of 
white children into the families of color. Following Oluo’s analysis, these movements are 
sanctioned only when they operate in service of white supremacy. 
32 Id. 
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imposing work requirements and limiting how long they could receive 
benefits.33“ 
Further, TANF mandated that federal funds would be allocated to 
individual states via block-grants. Thus, states are granted tremendous 
leeway in how TANF funds are spent. A 2015 study conducted by the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that $3 of every $4 allocated 
to TANF is spent elsewhere. Notably, these funds, intended for the 
working poor, are often re-allocated to fund state child welfare programs. 
Given the ongoing pathologization of families of color, parents of color 
are more likely to encounter Child Protective Services than their white 
counterparts. Complaints and sanctions are often in response to a 
perceived inability to provide financially for one’s child34. Thus, parents 
are seldom given supports that would enable them to keep their children 
in their home. In a New York Times op-ed, Emma S. Ketteringham, 
managing director of the family defense practice at the Bronx Defenders, 
recounts the experiences of a client referred to as Eline35. As Ketteringham 
tells us, most of the cases of child removal that she encounters are credited 
to neglect, rather than abuse. Neglect is a catchall term. Given its fuzzy 
borders and ambiguity, state interventions attributed to neglect often 
follow a perceived inability to provide financially. Ketteringham writes 
Eline did not need parenting classes; she already loved 
and cared for her children. She needed a home that wasn’t 
infested with rats  . . .  And it should have given her the 
financial assistance that went to the foster parents. The 
trauma of this approach cannot be underestimated: studies 
show that foster care, even for short periods of time, can 
carry risks to children and diminish outcomes.36 
Further, charges of neglect and the potential removal of children from 
their families of origin are directly related to the imposition of welfare-to-
work policies. Clinton-era welfare reforms were justified through the 
evocation of the figural welfare queen. Informed by the neoliberal rhetoric 
of personal responsibility, welfare became contingent upon recipients’ 
productivity and waged labor. Despite increased regulation and 
                                                                                                             
33 Edin, Kathryn & H. Luke Shaefer, 20 Years Since Welfare Reform, THE ATLANTIC (22 
August 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/20-years-welfare-
reform/496730/ 
34 Implicit Bias in Child Welfare, Education, and Mental Health Systems, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW (Michael Harris & Hannah Benton, eds.,2015). 
35 Emma S. Ketteringham, Live in a Poor Neighborhood? Better Be a Perfect Parent, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/poor-
neighborhoods-black-parents-child-services.html. 
36 Id. 
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contingencies, the amount of aid provided to families remains inadequate. 
As such, parents who depend on welfare must work, but seldom receive 
subsidies and/or aid sufficient to provide their children with adequate 
childcare while they are away. If these parents remain with their children 
and fail to work, they may lose their welfare benefits and ability to provide 
financially for their children. Given the ways in which neglect is deployed 
against poor and/or working-class parents, the inability to work may lead 
to arrest and the suspension of parental rights. However, leaving children 
while one works may similarly lead to arrest or the removal of children37. 
As such, neoliberal policies including welfare-to-work reforms place poor 
parents in an impossible position. These conditions allow for a figural bad 
parent to emerge. This always already neglectful parent is posited against 
an imagined good parent, increasing conceived of as white, gay, and 
affluent. 
IV. HOMONORMATIVITY AND THE PATHOLOGIZATION OF 
FAMILIES OF COLOR 
In my reading of NPR’s Gay Adoption of Black Children Raises 
Concerns, I allude to the ways in which homonormative political 
formations obscure the workings of neoliberal hegemony. As I consider 
how emerging homonormative formations are used to further marginalize 
families of color, I find it necessary to define homonormativity. How does 
homonormativity operate? To what is it oriented? Here, I define 
homonormativity through a critical analysis of the New York Times’ 
coverage of same-sex marriage legislation. 
My use of homonormativity follows Lisa Duggan’s work in The 
Twilight of Equality: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on 
Democracy38. As Duggan tells us, “The new sexual neoliberal politics  . . .  
might be termed the new homonormativity - it is a politics that does not 
contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but 
sustains and upholds them, while promising the possibility of  . . .  a 
                                                                                                             
37 See Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far,THE NATION 
(Sept. 30, 2015) https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gone-
too-far/. In July 2015, Laura Browder of Houston, TX was arrested for child abandonment 
after bringing her children – then aged 6 and 2 – to a food court while she interviewed for 
a job. The children were 30 feet away from their parent, and never out of Browder’s line 
of sight. In 2014, Debra Harrell of South Carolina was arrested for allowing her 9-year-old 
child to play at a park alone while she worked a shift at McDonald’s. 
38 LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, 
AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY (2012). 
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privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and 
consumption.”39 
Though imagined as a single-issue political formation, 
homonormativity operates within and in the service of a broad neoliberal 
project. Specifically, homonormativity advocates for the inclusion of gay 
and lesbian subjects within conservatizing institutions, namely marriage, 
military, and market. While my focus here is on homonormativity, this 
phenomenon is not exclusive to homonormative formations. Rather, it is 
endemic to those bodies, arrangements, and ways of being that may be 
incorporated within the category of legibility through the neoliberal 
rhetorics of multiculturalism, and the co-optation of diversity and 
inclusion initiatives. 
Homonormativity is oriented toward models of inclusion wherein gay 
and lesbian subjects are incorporated within hegemonic institutions 
through the “intensification of normalization.”40 In the expansion of 
normativity and the broadening of the normative body politic, neoliberal 
institutions are replicated and reified. Thus, neoliberal hegemony is 
necessarily invested in the project of inclusion. 
Further, homonormative politics is contingent upon the assumption 
that the homonormative subject does not differ from the heteronormative 
subject. As Duggan tells us, the assertion of sameness is evident in the 
mission statements of neoliberal gay organizations. In Equality, Inc., 
Duggan critiques the Internet Gay Forum’s rhetoric of inclusion. In their 
mission statement, the group maintains that they “deny conservative 
claims that gays and lesbians pose any threat to social morality or the 
political order. We equally oppose progressive claims that gays should 
support radical social change or restructuring of society41.” Though 
articulated as a refusal to engage with those political projects that imperil 
“the political order,” the Internet Gay Forum’s mission statement is not 
apolitical. Rather, it reflects a desire to operate in conjunction with existing 
socio-political structures, thereby sustaining neoliberal hegemony. 
In my initial conception of this project, I aimed to map the narrative 
of same-sex marriage legislation with and against the New York Times’ 
discussion of racial disparities in foster care and adoption. I traced the 
emergence of the “good” homonormative subject against the ongoing 
pathologization of racialized subjects and families of color. As per 
Duggan, homonormativity is a highly visible political formation.42 This 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. at 179. 
40 Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES: A J. OF 
FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD., 1, 14-44 (Spring 2002). 
41 DUGGAN, supra note 39, at 48-50. 
42 Id. 
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visibility was evident in the number of New York Times articles focusing 
on same-sex marriage legislation.43 The New York Times cultivated an 
archive focusing on “news about same-sex marriage, civil unions, and 
domestic partnerships.” The archive comprised almost exclusively of 
articles published in the New York Times features hundreds of news 
articles and editorials. In my survey of this archive, a clear progressive arc 
emerged, culminating in the 2015 Supreme Court ruling that the 
Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage. In my reading of this 
archive, I explore how the 2016 Supreme Court ruling upholding same-
sex adoption continues this progressive trajectory. US racialized marriage 
histories are entangled with the right to parent. Informed by the content of 
this archive, I ask, what do the parallel narratives of homonormativity and 
racialized parenthood revealed in these readings indicated about 
parenthood and personhood/citizenship? 
Alternately, the New York Times seldom grappled with racial 
disparities in foster care and adoption. In my review of archived articles 
published between 2003 and the present, fewer than two dozen pieces 
considered racial disparities in foster care, adoption, and/or encounters 
with Child Protective Services. Admittedly, my survey of archived articles 
does not reflect the New York Times as published. Nonetheless, I find the 
comparative lack of coverage to be telling. Further, discussions of racial 
disparities within these systems were confined to black children. While 
other racialized groups were mentioned, their inclusion was cursory. As 
such, my analysis centers upon the experiences of black families and 
children. 
My use of homonormativity is further informed by Judith Butler’s 
critique of homonormative politics. In Is Kinship Always Already 
Heterosexual, Butler offers three conceptual categories: legitimate, 
illegitimate, and unthinkable.44 Legitimate subjects and arraignments 
abide state logics and are legible within hegemonic institutions. In politics, 
the illegitimate - that which is not yet, but may become legitimate - are 
rendered legitimate. Alternately, the unthinkable exist beyond the realm 
of the il/legitimate and can never be made legitimate. The incorporation of 
unthinkable subjects within state logics would necessitate the unraveling 
of neoliberal ideologies and institutions. 
Following Butler, I value the unthinkable for their transformative 
potential. Nonetheless, I find it necessary to trouble Butler’s conception of 
these categories. As written, they are mutually exclusive and rigid. In my 
analysis, I consider how il/legitimate subjects may be positioned as 
unthinkable, regardless of their legibility to the state. I focus on the 
                                                                                                             
43 Id. 
44 Butler, supra note 41, at 17-19. 
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precarity that follows this misrecognition. I maintain that subjects who 
trouble a normative body politic, regardless of their codified relation to the 
state, are positioned as unthinkable. In particular, I consider how racialized 
“legitimate” subjects reveal the limits of state-sanctioned politics. 
Through critical discourse analysis, I come to understand the racialized 
subject as an “almost, but not quite” citizen. Notably, this conception of 
citizenship is not written into the law. Rather, it reflects the law as 
implemented, informed and distorted by socio-cultural factors. 
Feminist scholar Patti Duncan considers how “diversity and 
inclusion” operate within the neoliberal university.45 Duncan’s analysis 
follows her experiences as a woman of color in women and gender studies, 
particularly the conditions the led to her resignation from a tenure-track 
faculty position.46 Duncan argues that the neoliberal university operates as 
a nation-state, wherein citizenship is limited to particular subjects.47 As 
Duncan tells us, citizenship as constructed here could not extend to a 
woman of color.48 As such, Duncan’s position within her program and the 
academe broadly were tenuous. Following Duncan’s conception of 
citizenship as a political and social category constituted through subjects’ 
relation to dominant hegemony, I argue that citizenship is at best, 
precarious, and at worst, unattainable for racialized subjects. This 
contestable citizenship was explored formally and informally at LatCrit 
XXI, most often in relation to Donald Trump’s tweets about Puerto Ricans 
following the devastation of Hurricane Maria. In Trump’s tweets – and the 
federal government’s response to the crisis – Puerto Ricans were 
positioned as almost, but not quite citizens.49 Thus, federal aid and 
intervention was presented as charitable. The devastation of Hurricane 
Maria and the Trumpian discourse surrounding the aftermath were a 
shadow that carried into much of LatCrit XXI. This specter was felt in the 
absence of those who were unable to attend due to the hurricane, and in 
conversations between those who were able to attend. 
Within the logics of (homo)normative reproductive temporalities, it 
follows that homonormative political formations would orient themselves 
toward the expansion of family rights, namely gay and lesbian subjects’ 
right to adopt. I maintain that parenthood - or, in liberal rhetoric, the right 
to parent - is the domain of the citizen. As noted above, racialized subjects, 
regardless of their formal legitimacy, possess a tenuous citizenship. 
                                                                                                             
45 Patti Duncan, Hot Commodities, Cheap Labor: Women of Color in the Academy, 35 
FRONTIERS: A J. OF WOMEN STUD., 1, 39-63 (2014). 
46 See generally id. 
47 Id. at 52. 
48 See id. at 55. 
49 Id. 
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In Hot Commodities, Cheap Labor, Duncan maintains that “good” 
pedagogy and theory are racialized.50 That is, these pedagogies and 
theories are situated within the dominant discourse of white supremacy. In 
as much as the home operates as a site of learning, parenting models and 
home pedagogies are similarly racialized. Through the analytic of 
citizenship, I consider how the homonormative subject comes to embody 
“good” home pedagogies. 
Notably, the whiteness of homonormativity is not (necessarily) 
identitarian. Fundamentally, the homonormative subject is non-
heterosexual citizen who otherwise embodies a neoliberal ideal. As such, 
most homonormative subjects are white. More importantly, 
homonormativity is necessarily oriented toward whiteness. Here, I evoke 
Sara Ahmed’s conception of whiteness as a “straightening device.51“ In 
Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed considers how compulsory 
heterosexuality (and later, whiteness) operate as straightening devices.52 
As Ahmed tells us, 
“Spaces and bodies become straight as an effect of 
repetition. That is, the repetition of actions which tends 
toward some objects, shapes the ‘surface’ of space  . . .  
The repetition of actions  . . .  shapes the contours of the 
body. We get stuck in certain alignments as an effect of 
this work.53” 
Following her experiences within a mixed-race family, Ahmed 
considers how normative orientations, namely heterosexuality and 
whiteness, orient bodies toward normative ways of being, thereby 
“straightening” them.54 Through the image of the family table, Ahmed 
considers how whiteness and its objects operate as straightening devices, 
and how objects associated with her father’s racialized lineage were 
otherized within the dictates of the heterosexual home. Following 
Ahmed’s discussion of orientation, I consider how homonormative 
subjects are straightened through an orientation toward whiteness. 
Now, I place Ahmed’s discussion of whiteness in conversation with 
Duncan’s analysis of “good” pedagogies and theories. In both 
(homo)normative and queer discourse, gay and lesbian bodies are 
constructed as necessarily non-reproductive. As noted previously, 
                                                                                                             
50 See Duncan, supra note 46 at 55. 
51 SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS, OTHERS, 38-40 
(2006). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 92. 
54 See id. at 92. 
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homonormative subjects are move toward and with whiteness. As such, 
homonormative subjects are repositories for “good” home pedagogies and 
parenting models. Thus, gay and lesbian subjects are imagined as childless 
formations through which children of color may be “saved” from their 
pathologized families of origin. Often, there is minimal or no attempt to 
place these children with other family members - implicitly, other people 
of color. Following the NABSW’s assertion that the adoption of black 
children by white parents constitutes “cultural genocide,”55 how might we 
understand the placement of children of color within homonormative 
families to be an effort to construct “good” racialized subjects? 
In NPR’s Gay Adoption of Black Children Raises Concerns, gay and 
lesbian potential parents are discussed as a “desirable” market for both 
public child welfare programs and privatized adoption firms. Jill Jacobs, 
executive director of Family Builders by Adoptions states, 
They don’t have this Ozzie and Harriet notion of what a 
family should be and how kids should come, and don’t 
necessarily have a need for newborn babies. And so, you 
kind of have a blank slate. And they walk in the door and 
we can say, this is what we need. These are the kids we 
have. Would you? Could you? And they say yes. 
As Duggan tells us, neoliberalism frames the gay subject as a 
“normative consumer citizen.”56 Within these logics, children (of color) 
are constructed as commodities for the good, gay citizen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In tracing the ways in which the expansion of normativity through 
legal frameworks might exacerbate the precarity of parents and children 
of color, I offer no simple solution for how to resolve these conditions. 
This reflects the scope of the issue, but also my scholarly and institutional 
position. I came to LatCrit XXI as a feminist humanities scholar with 
focuses in queer and crip theories. My engagements with critical race 
theory and outsider jurisprudence emerge from these scholarly 
trajectories. Initially, I engaged with legal frameworks as potential archive 
in which to interrogate the normalization of queerness and its implications 
in the neoliberal moment. Informed by the illuminating and generative 
conversations I encountered at LatCrit XXI, I consider the transformative 
potential of solidarities and collaborations between LatCrit and similar 
                                                                                                             
55 See supra discussion text accompanying note 20. 
56 DUGGAN, supra note 39 at 180. 
138 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
 
legal formations and interdisciplinary feminist, queer, and/or critical 
scholars. Situated as I am in an interdisciplinary discipline with a focus on 
literature, art, and/or media, LatCrit offers tangible, material ways of 
engaging with issues of social justice. The need for solidarities between 
social justice-oriented scholars is made all the more urgent in the 
Trumpian moment. Here, I briefly reflect on the moments from the LatCrit 
XXI conference in which these solidarities and opportunities for 
collaboration felt the most salient. 
The Art, Activism, and Law roundtable facilitated by Nikki Reisch 
and Kristin Norderval opened spaces for solidarities and collaborations 
between those working in and through the law, activists, and artists. In 
establishing an interactive space, Reisch and Norderval troubled the 
expert-audience dichotomies that permeate much of academic conference 
culture. Similarly, I would argue that the socio-political marginalization 
of artists, community organizers, and independent scholars prevents 
meaningful collaborations between them and those positioned in the legal 
academe. In my continual engagement with homonormativity and 
parenthood, I consider the ways in which engagements with activist 
frameworks including transformative justice, and art and popular media 
might shift this project, and my reading of these legal frameworks. 
Similarly, the Dystopias, Utopias, and Resistance roundtable focused 
on the ways in which dystopian and/or utopian fictions related to the 
material work of legal scholarship. In particular, I was moved by the ways 
in which those on the roundtable – Saru Matambanadzo, Atiba Ellis, 
Anthony Farley, Marc-Tizoc González, and Brandt T. Lee – engaged with 
science fiction, specifically the work of Octavia Butler. If my work as a 
humanities scholar is moved in generative and meaningful ways through 
engagement with critical legal frameworks, this roundtable alluded to how 
LatCrit and the legal academe more broadly might engage with other 
(interdisciplinary) branches of scholarship. In listening to them reflect 
upon their affinities for these literary texts, and the ways in which literary 
content informs their work, I was reminded of a question posed at an 
earlier forum wherein participants were asked to engage with the metaphor 
of law as medicine. While participants’ responses were varied and 
reflected the realities of their particular investments in the law, all of those 
featured expressed some ambivalence about the law as enacted. In feeling 
for solidarities between my chosen discipline and LatCrit, I return again 
and again to this moment. In my initial conception of this project, I posited 
homonormativity against parenting queerly. Whereas homonormativity is 
confined by the dictates of neoliberal politics, parenting queerly reflects 
investments in orientations beyond the normative. Stated differently, 
parenting queerly reflects the enactment of Butler’s unthinkable. While 
the attributes of parenting queerly remain fuzzy, I am drawn to the radical 
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potential of this ambiguity. I feel a similar ambiguity in the question of 
law as medicine, and in the potential of solidarities between critical legal 
theory and other social justice-oriented disciplines. Parenting queerly, for 
me, emerges from a refusal to engage with homonormativity and its 
imperatives. Similarly, what transformative engagements might emerge 
through a refusal to engage with the law as medicine if and when it harms? 
What transformative forms of accountability, community, and 
relationality follow from this generative refusal, enabled by these 
solidarities? 
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